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‘Inventing an event or an object is a wonderful thing, but inventing it again has more to do 
with power than it does with invention: you are proving that you are powerful enough to 
arrange the same conditions’ Davis Robbins, art critic.  
 
Cindy Sherman’s work throws into question not only the representability of women but 
the discursive unity of dominant modes of painting and portrait photography. This article 
focuses on selections from two series in her work. Firstly, it consults the History Portraits
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of 1988-1990, where Sherman parodies Classical Art subjects and fabricates historical 
portraiture. Secondly, it focuses on a selection of untitled works known as Film Stills from 
1977-1980, where Sherman, amidst a matrix of film codes, obscures a specific target of 
impersonation. The structure of this commentary moves from the ontology of staged 
photography, to codes of theatre and then the codes of cinema as the sources of 
Sherman’s inspiration. What Sherman’s series have in common is that they catalogue 
images which all centre upon the artist as a transformable and arguably impersonal form 
(Phelan 1993: 68). It concludes with Sherman’s legacy to postmodern mimesis in relation 
to women and gender identity. 
 
At this point, it necessary to interrogate the limits of the use of ‘the impersonal form’ 
in this discussion, and correspondingly, how philosophical discourse may engage with 
the object of enquiry – namely the practice of staged photography and Sherman’s 
pretences to autofacture. The impersonal form is the surface of our artist, who is a 
participant in a performance that necessitates a disavowal of her subjectivity. The 
theoretical partner to this process is described by Emmanuel Levinas in his essay 
‘There is’
2
 which appears in the context of his work Existence and Existents. Levinas’s 
essay ‘There is’ is unique in that he uses theatrical metaphors to explain interstitial 
  
presences in a nocturnal space. This is why, it could be argued, that his thesis is so 
readily engaged with discourses of other modes of mediation predicated on a darkened 
space – such as the stage, cinema and photography. The human presences within 
these spaces are referred to as generalised Being, and the nocturnal space has the 
temporal limitation of night and the property of darkness. The ‘Beings’ within this space 
are differentiated from ‘Existents’ - subjects who are constituted in a way consistent 
with the social world outside the nocturnal space. His concept of the anonymous form 
expresses impersonality in terms that are highly confronting and yet transformative of 
the spaces it inhabits. His description of a privileged, impersonal Being also draws 
upon ideas such as Durkheim’s ‘impersonality of the sacred in primitive religions’ 
(Levinas 1989: 31). It relies upon what are argued as highly relevant metaphors – 
those specific and useful articulations Levinas provides on the relationship between an 
anonymous form rendered ‘impersonal’ by its enabling nocturnal space and 
subsequent aesthetic examples, such as the ghosts within Shakespearean drama. The 
following is Levinas’s construction: 
There is is an impersonal form, like in it rains, or it is warm. Its anonymity is 
essential. The mind does not find itself faced with an apprehended exterior. The 
exterior – if one insists on the term – remains uncorrelated with an interior. It is no 
longer given. It is no longer a world. What we call the I is itself submerged by the 
night, invaded, depersonalized, stifled by it. The disappearance of all things and 
of the I leaves what cannot disappear, the sheer fact of being in which one 
participates, whether one wants to or not, without having taken the initiative, 
anonymously (Levinas 1989: 30-31)   
 
It is my argument that aesthetic responses have been made to these philosophical 
models of Being in the postmodern context and that Sherman’s work stages a 
detectable transformability and self-fashioning, within that paradox of anonymity that 
makes her work both theatrically and theoretically dense. 
 
Sherman places her work in a mimetic genre known as staged photography. Although 
she imitates dominant constructions of Fine Art subjects and women in Hollywood film 
  
stills, Sherman does this through the performative presence of the 
impersonal/impersonator who appears object-like within the work. So rather than 
aiming for a realist verisimilitude of her copied target, her presentation is as much 
informing the practice of the work as it interpolates with the desires and expectations of 
the spectator in unravelling the meanings of certain signs.
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Sherman’s work, for all its potency in appearing to deconstruct dominant gender 
significations, is paradoxical on the issue of gender politics, as Laura Mulvey argues in 
‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, by reading the artist’s anti-theoretical stance 
through her omission of theoretical citations or signposts (Mulvey 1996: 65). However, 
Sherman’s citation of the dominant codes of gender visibility is a choice that Mulvey 
argues is the ideal invitation to any subsequent theoretical response (Mulvey 1996: 
65). It arguably enables a practice in which a re-enacted female impersonation poses 
the potential for a new performative technique. The dialogue between theatricalised 
female impersonation by a woman and the feminist theories of the crisis in 
representing women articulated by Joan Riviere, Laura Mulvey and Peggy Phelan, 
sees a deconstructive modality of female impersonation by a woman, where 
subservsion is enabled by the repetition of a heteronormative spectacle. The notion of 
impersonation in this sense is complicated by Mulvey’s claim of the anti-theoretical, 
where Sherman either deconstructs or repeats fetishistic images of women. Like 
parody, its signification can only be understood in terms of a wider practice that 
sometimes favours either conservative or subversive strategies in the struggle to fix 
meaning. One of the ways that Sherman’s work may be read as resolving the struggle 
between deconstructive and patriarchal signification of women is through the creative 
intervention of the hysteric. The hysteric is understood in psychoanalytic terms to be 
the embodiment of a crisis in representation (Bronfen 1996: 50). Read as such, 
Sherman’s work becomes a theoretical intervention when the detectable presence of 
self-fabrication questions the performativity of mainstream subjects, while calling its 
  
own capacity for representation into question. Her choice of the liminal art form of 
staged photography is arguably the ideal medium for her postmodern provocations 
about the instability of identity. 
Between the Photograph and the Theatre 
 
Michael Köhler identifies the phenomenon of staged photography as part of a 
‘paradigmatic change [which] must have occurred about 1980, a shift in style similar to 
that which took place in painting, dance, architecture and design, described in those 
circles as a transition from “Modernist” to “post-Modern” aesthetics’ (Köhler 1995: 16). 
The change, Köhler argues, is not so much in the historical progression of these 
discourses, rather a philosophical dichotomy as to the function and ontology of the 
photograph – representation as truth or representation as fabrication. This binary is 
identified by Köhler as either modern or postmodern assumptions about photography, 
that exist simultaneously in contemporary culture. The photograph in the modernist 
understanding is: ‘brutally direct, pure and devoid of trickery’, as rendering a subject in 
absolute objectivity, according to the American photographic journal Camera Work, 
dating back to 1916 (Köhler 1995: 17). The credo of the modernist photographer is 
that the artist should find and not invent his subjects, not alter the reality s/he chooses, 
aim to render images as ‘objectively’ as possible, not manipulate the negatives in the 
darkroom, produce prints of the highest technical perfection with a range of grey tones 
and prints unaltered and regard the photograph as the result of a choice of subject 
and masterly selection of camera view, focal length and exposure time, with no 
affectations or painterly affects (Köhler 1995: 18). This understanding of technology-
as-truth has been deconstructed with a reading of the companionate nature of 
modernist mimetic technologies as serving both the ethnographic project and wartime 
propaganda. Subjects could indeed be ‘invented’ by ideological, colonial and political 
mechanisms.
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 The ethos of the modernist photographer seems to imply a mimetic ‘fair 
  
play’ while the postmodern assumes the inverse, almost an act of imposture, acting in 




The postmodern photograph’s achievement is in its ability to create an 
autonomous performance space and undermine the claims of photography to stand 
for truth, objectivity or realism. Ultimately ‘staged photography’ is the culmination of 
these postmodern challenges to the truth of the captured subject through the creation 
of a space posing as narrative or posing as portraiture, but evacuated of subjectivity. 
The staged photograph for its will-to-narrate is ironically interchangeable with the 
fetishist, myth-making of fashion photography. To this effect, Henry Sayre in The 
Object of Performance suggests that one of Sherman’s works entered the mainstream 
media of Vogue as an advertisement (Sayre 1989: 63), where its capacity to deploy 
and parody the signification of the fashion model also places Sherman’s performativity 
in the more enlivened modes of a narrative, theatrical event. The connection between 
visibility, fashion and the concept of gender as a performance find a commonality in 
the staging of dress-up as an event of private theatre in Cindy Sherman’s 
photographic world. They are reflected in social discourses, too. Writings about 
fantasy dress-up as a form of private theatre in domestic space illuminates the 
resonances of Sherman’s work. Jean Duruz, Elizabeth Wilson and Frigga Haug are 
feminists who work in the discourses of fashion as sites of the narratives of 
daydreams and fantasised private self-fashionings, that hinge between the ‘elaborate, 
fetishized, neurotic’ and the ‘ambiguous pursuits of exploitation, waste, desire and 
pleasure’ (Duruz 1995: 130). The space between public myths of femininity and the 
private meanings of self-styling is described as the negotiation of a memory (Duruz 
1995: 130), which, then can be argued as continually re-enacted.  
 
 Rosalind Krauss accounts for the alienating and fragmented nature of Sherman’s 
dress-up signification in the internal draping, framing and gesturing of the body with 
  
fabric, which is observable in the History Portraits, that resembles a ‘giddy enactment 
of frames-within-frames’ much more than naturalised costume (Krauss 1993: 174). 
This is augmented by the inclusion of body prostheses that are meant to startle within 
the overall presentation: 
In their very detachability, these elements point thus to the hermeneutic 
dimension of the work of art: the idea that it possesses an inner truth or 
meaning to which the interpreter might penetrate (Krauss 1993: 174). 
 
The idea of the image requiring an active spectatorship to detect and unravel 
layers of technical effects adds to the possibility that the image is indexical to 
an event or process, as well as a framed product. 
 
Roland Barthes called photography ‘a kind of primitive theatre’ (Barthes 1984: 32) 
and in so doing invokes a space in which the image traces a performance. To 
determine the kind of performance Sherman creates, Peggy Phelan suggests that: 
‘models imitate the image they believe photographers see through the camera lens’ 
(Phelan 1993: 36). This develops from the premise of the image as imitation, an 
etymological link emphasised by Barthes in his essay ‘Rhetoric of the Image’ (Barthes 
1977: 32). When the imitation of the gaze is made continuous with the concept that 
the image is itself a copy, then somehow the imitation of a subject is implicated in this 
process. In her History Portraits, Sherman is an impostor of history, a stand-in for the 
male and female subjects of Classical portraiture. 
The History Portraits 
 
These portraits are untitled and were completed between the period of 1988-1990. 
They evince great variations in the degree to which the image allows the photograph 
to rupture through the veneer of painterly effects. Sherman teases the spectator with 
the possibility that she has plagiarised a famous work of art, but where no original 
work of art exists she has arguably impersonated a plagiarist, constructing something 
  
highly original but under the guise of an extant art history. Krauss suggests that the 
spectator who possesses the genuine belief in the existence of an original referent 
could be explained through her reading of Barthes’ theory of the habitual consumption 
of myth in mainstream culture: 
 Myth is the act of draining history out of signs and reconstructing these 
signs instead as ‘instances’; in particular, instances of universal truths or 
of natural law, of things that have no history, no specific embeddedness, 
no territory of contestation. Myth steals into the heart of the sign to 
convert the historical into the ‘natural’ – something that is uncontested, 
that is simply ‘the way things are’ (Krauss 1993: 25).  
 
By playing upon the propensity for spectators to expect and digest myths at the 
level of the signs of Classical portraiture, Sherman interpolates with their desires 
further by reconfiguring the body of ‘art subject’ as layered with highly detectable 
prostheses, that are in tension with the overall image:  
Sherman abandons the photographic tradition and returns to the putative 
subjectivity encoded in fine art painting . . . After looking at a series of 
these photographs, in which she re-enacts the postures, poses, and mise-
en-scénes of portraits of both men and women, the human body itself 
seems like a handy holder for a thousand prostheses (Phelan 1993: 68). 
 
This is reinforced by Sherman’s capacity to be highly interchangeable in her 
appearance and strategies throughout the range of the portraits. The foregrounding of 
wigs, noses, body hair and fake breast function as a verfremdsdungseffekt of the 
prosthetic. Phelan accounts for the use of the prosthetic by suggesting that the vacuity 
of the body in representation not only demands the costume but the prosthetic: ‘the 
body in and of itself – the body-without-disguise becomes a vacant, unmarked canvas. 
The attempt to see and paint the body, to make it visible, requires that the artist ‘add’ 
a prop to that stage’ (Phelan 1993: 68). Furthermore, it can be argued that the 
arrangement of the prosthetic’s detectability engages with the notion of hysteria, not 
as an inner psychic mechanism but as an alternative paradigm of performance and 
spectatorship. Ironically, this is an argument considered with much more force by 
  
commentators in relation to the Film Stills, but in this context, the detectable prosthetic 
destroys the unity of the Classical image with pathological force. 
 
As Rosalind Krauss observes in her essay ‘Destiny of the Informe’ it is not only 
the layering effect of the prop but the destruction of the totality of the image, which, 
Sherman achieves through the prosthetic: 
For if the woman-as-fetish is to function, it must be not just as a perfect 
Gestalt, a whole body from the outlines of which nothing is ‘missing’, but 
as a vertical one as well – the orientation that the Gestalt always assumes 
in the imaginary field, mirroring as it does the viewer’s own bodily 
dimension (Bois 1997: 241). 
 
It is the verticality of the signification of the woman’s body that also reflects the gaze 
that she invites from the spectator whose vision is conditioned by mainstream culture. 
The male gaze particularly is in partnership with the ‘woman-as-fetish’ spectatorship in 
which the scopophilic gaze following a vertical direction is further emphasised at the 
level of the prosthetic, given the visible strain it imposes on the dominant notion of 
‘perspective’ in High Art: 
from the series she produced of ‘Old Master’ portraits, where the horizontal 
is played out as the work of gravity, pulling on the prosthetic devices 
attached to the bodies of the sitters, and thus disaggregating the formal 
wholes that high art holds together as within so many concentric frames 
(Bois 1997: 242). 
 
In the image #222, from 1990 (reprinted in Krauss 1993: 175) the classical posture 
and totality of the image is undermined by the incongruous semi-naked appearance of 
the mature female. The detectable wig and sloping prosthetic breasts foreground the 
signifiers of age but work against the totality of a look that seems historically 
Puritanical given the lace collar laid curiously on naked shoulders, an arched cap and 
eyes of earnest and intense moral gaze. The combination of these significations is 
both de-sexualised and voyeuristic, which, ruptures the unity of the image. The viewer 
is invited to gaze vertically but abandons this in order to make sense of its narrative. 
  
Impersonation does not narrate and so this image mirrors back to the spectator the 
unsatisfying question of an originary subject, via Sherman’s object-like presence, 
subjugated by dominant constructions of age, gender and the male gaze. 
 
Perhaps the simplest technical construction in the series is the figure of the aged 
man, asleep at his books in the work #227 from 1990 (reprinted in Krauss 1993: 168). 
The figure assumes the normative posturing of Classical portraiture, except for the 
foregrounding of the beard. The light falls upon a glittering, silver beard, unnaturally 
profuse with hair and with the unnatural sheen of a prosthetic, that is inconsistent both 
with the period and the normative practice of Classical painting, that attempts to 
naturalise such incongruities.  
 
This image invites the spectator to unmask the impostor who houses itself within 
the mimetic world of the portrait, with the sheen of the beard betraying the border 
between the clarity of oil painting and the lighting of a photographic studio. Sherman is 
equally adept at arranging masculine disguise as she is at feminine, which, suggests 
that her target is, at times, visual culture itself.  
The Film Stills and Hysterical Signification 
 
It has been argued that hysteria, as an active attempt at self-representation, can be 
imitative and self-reflexive; the overall practice anticipating the desires of the spectator 
and interpolating with them, as much as the analyst is regarded as the spectator in the 
aesthetic context. 
Stavros Mentzos theorises the hysteric as a spectacle of alterity:  
Those affected by hysteria move internally (in accordance with their 
experience) and externally (in accordance with public appearance) 
into a state in which they experience themselves as quasi-other, and 
in the eyes of those around them appear other than they are (Bronfen 
1998: 421).  
  
 
The notion of appearing as ‘quasi-other’ exists in the cumulative effect of Sherman’s 
images. Elisabeth Bronfen argues that this slippage between resemblance and 
identification imitates the memory traces of hysteria: 
If the classic hysteric suffers from reminiscences, finds herself subject 
to belated memory traces whose origins are unknown to her, 
Sherman provokes, though now for the viewer, the analogous effect 
of being confronted with freely floating and overdetermined memory 
traces (Bronfen 1996: 50). 
 
This memory trace surfaces as a fragmented sign: ‘Possessed by memory traces, 
suffering from representation, her other self of the imagination oscillates between the 
play of simulacrums [sic], the essence of the aesthetic code of perfection, and a 
traumatic mass, the monstrous’ (Bronfen 1998: 423). In Sherman’s Film-Still images, 
the spectator may make the association between the image and a traumatic or 
disturbing incident, what Bronfen might call the performance of a ‘memory trace,’ 
which, is like a cultural mnemonic of filmic signs.  
 
Sherman’s capacity for hysterical signification can be read, not so much in what 
Barbara Creed identifies as the literal signs of hysteria such as screaming or running 
away (Creed 1995: 144) but in the obscuring of subjectivity and interiority, repeatedly 
throughout the series. Producing the paradoxical authentic copy is about scrambling 
recognisable codes and activating strips of memory in the spectator. Krauss explains 
how Sherman has not copied exact images at all but repeated and re-simulated 
certain conventions: 
Most of her later critics who have written about the Untitled Film Stills, 
acknowledge that Sherman is manipulating stereotypes and that though 
these are being relayed through a generalized matrix of filmic portrayals 
and projections, there is of course no real film, no ‘original’, to which any 
one of them is actually referring  (Krauss 1993: 36). 
 
  
Sherman’s Film Stills are understood as having no original, although Krauss’s account 
tells the legendary tale of Sherman presenting her works in an art school talk, 
supplying all the original referents to explain her images that were reputed to be exact 
copies (Krauss 1993: 17). Krauss mentions an art critic’s dismayed response to 
Sherman’s ‘stroke-for-stroke meticulousness of the copy’ in her film stills and the 
misunderstanding that she has used real film references: 
Although he is upset by what this comparison reveals about the 
slavishness of Sherman’s procedure . . . he is certain that what Sherman 
is after in any case is a recognition of the original, although not as a 
source waiting to be replicated, but rather as a memory waiting to be 
summoned (Krauss 1993: 17). 
 
The mind of the spectator, even the art critic, is asked to conjure up from the haze of 
clones, the illuminated original in an epiphany that does not come: 
The condition of Sherman’s work in the Film Stills – and part of their point, 
we could say – is the simulacral nature of what they contain, the condition 
of being a copy without an original (Krauss 1993: 17).  
 
By producing an ‘authentic copy’ (Krauss 1993: 20) of a non-existent original, 
Sherman stages the desire to be detected in mediated space in order to effect 
the deconstruction of the referent image, even if that image in turn is 
shattered as a crisis in representation. In recognising the elements of myth 
that perpetuate the filmic image, Barthes’ analysis of myth is revealed as 
having the effect of demonstrating itself as a language-in-process (Krauss 
1993: 25).   
 
In her outside Film Stills #22 from 1978 (reprinted in Krauss 1993: 29) and #83 from 
1980 respectively (reprinted in Krauss 1993: 55), Sherman walks with the poise of the 
flaneur but there is a sense of displacement. It appears that she doesn’t belong to the 
urban environment around her or is being stalked by a companionate presence that her 
posture and averted glances betray. There is little sign of the identity of the woman, as 
  
her body is situated around civic buildings and in public spaces; rather there are simply 
the signs of an identity and, therefore, like the impersonal form of Levinas, she remains 
anonymous. 
 
Sherman’s appearance as an anonymous form is a technique that also coincides with 
the impersonal nature of the ‘generic’. Krauss defers to Arthur Danto’s roll call of the 
‘girl’ in Sherman’s Film Stills: 
Another, more subtle form of myth-consumption, continuing to buy into the 
‘character’, is to see the multiplicity of these roles as various forms of what 
Arthur Danto seems to like to call ‘The Girl’. He provides his own roll call of 
these variants: The Girl in Trouble, The Girl Detective, The Girl We Left 
Behind, Daddy’s Brave Girl, Somebody’s Stenographer, Girl Friday, The 
Girl Next Door, The Whore with a Golden Heart . . . But his point is that 
‘the Girl is an allegory for something deeper and darker, in the mythic 
unconscious of everyone, regardless of sex’ (Krauss 1993: 41). 
 
Danto’s appraisal of these stock characters or stereotypes repeats the politics that 
Sherman’s energies are arguably resisting, and yet it indicates the tension in this kind 
of discursive field. Danto’s idea that the ‘girl’ may be a kind of free-floating signifier 
does touch upon some controversies about the representability of female agency. This 
is challenged by the function of the hysteric, as mentioned earlier, who does not 
clamour for representation but presents her clothing, stance and gesture as an 
imitation of the spectator’s gaze. While Sherman herself resists a theoretical and 
political stance, there is a fairly strong argument for reading the displacement of 
patriarchal codes in this series. Though it sounds like an inverse argument, an 
impersonator exists as impersonal in order to challenge its targeted original, rather 
than embody it. By invoking these empty categories, Danto’s reading politicises the 




The most iconic image in the Film Stills series, for its overt and self-ironising 
hysteria, is #27, from 1979 (reprinted in Krauss 1993: 33). The framing of the subject 
defies the compositional biases of conventional photographic portraiture. The head is 
chopped off at the forehead and the low cut, leopard-skin fur-lined blouse is the 
central signifier. The fact that the face is chopped off at the forehead makes the image 
voyeuristic – in a sense, it is imitative of the gaze of paparazzi, as is #83, from 1980. 
The surroundings, with martini glass and cigarette in hand, upon an ash-littered table, 
suggest a public bar. What may be noted is that her face, with its mascara-stained 
tears, is the most deconstructive mask of imposture.  The tears are self-reflexive of 
the modality itself: drawing the spectator into the crisis of representation, layered in 
hysterical signs, and the pathological imposture of a myth that exists only in the strip 
of a memory and a frenzied imagination. 
 
Hysteria effects a ‘bodily imitation of culture and an expression of discontent with it, a 
malady caused by phantasy, representation and reminiscences’ (Bronfen 1998: 423). 
The indifference of the hysteric to her own capacity for a wide range of self-
fashionings suggests a pathological desire for imposture, especially relating to the 
notions of the ‘fake’ and the ‘false,’ in ways that women fashion themselves in wider 
social contexts, perpetuating crises in women’s representation.  
 
While hysteria may be about the crisis of representing a self,  Sherman’s practice 
of presenting copies of film matrices without revealing their exact source in her Film 
Stills, has the arguable effect of mirroring the spectator’s problematic relationship to 
cultural memory: ‘In forcing us to invent narratives for her images, however, she 
hystericizes us’ (Bronfen 1998: 430). Bronfen suggests that Sherman’s images 
challenge our stability as spectators, to the point that spectators are conjoined in the 
process of mistaken visibilities. She appears as an impersonal copyist who has 
mastery by gazing over and purporting to control the meaning of the original 
  
performance. By provoking in the spectator what must seem in totality, a series of 
pathological misrecognitions, Sherman arguably structures her work in anticipation of 




Woman as Image  
 
Sherman’s work invites us to extend the definition of the female impersonator, in 
combination with her aesthetic strategies, for her capacity to layer signification that 
achieves both same-and-cross-gender impersonations. The impersonation of female-
to-female is an appropriate metaphor for theorising the way women may 
conservatively, or subversively, stage their own representations. Hegemonic 
representations of women threaten to occlude any performative status to women’s 
representations of themselves, or in Pamela Robertson’s words: ‘when she plays at 
being what she is already perceived to be’ (Robertson 1996: 12). This creates an 
uneasiness about who is being represented, the visible female subject or its 
impersonation (Phelan 1993: 60). This is connected with the essentialist-sounding 
argument that femininity itself is somehow an impersonation, or in Joan Riviere’s 
language of the psychoanalytic, ‘masquerade’ (Riviere 1929: 38). This is a suggestion 
which is limited by its claims to essentialism, but what it advances is the power of 
mobility through performance, theatricality and auto-facture. 
 
According to Joan Riviere, feminine masquerade is a compulsive act that wards 
off the reprisals of a male should he discover that the masquerading woman 
‘underneath’ is somehow emasculating:  
Womanliness therefore could be assumed and worn as a mask, both to 
hide the possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if 
she was found to possess it – much as a thief will turn out his pockets and 




This establishes a matrix of values surrounding Sherman’s female impersonation; that 
the hysterical impersonator uses masquerade as a form of imposture and that the 
female impersonator is one who reveals and transforms the burdensome meanings 
that the referent woman can only bear in silence. This is argued by Laura Mulvey:  
Woman . . . stands in patriarchal culture as signifier for the male other, 
bound by a symbolic order in which man can live out his fantasies and 
obsessions through linguistic command, by imposing them on the silent 
image of woman still tied to her place and bearer of meaning, not maker of 
meaning  (Mulvey 1989: 15). 
 
In Sherman’s work, the impersonal, interchangeable form challenges many sites of 
conservative visual orders such as Classical portraiture and 1950s Hollywood, by 
suggesting that woman is the stand-in, the impostor of patriarchal culture; rather than 
simply standing in patriarchal culture. She is not only the linchpin but the impersonator 
of a signifying system (Krauss 1993: 49), which, catches itself and the spectator in the 
act of transforming a meaning. The new theory becomes that: femininity is a facet of 
female impersonation which transforms meaning. The question of how much the 
subject is implicated or undermines patriarchal codes is a problematic one and is 
typical of the nature of parody in meaning to ‘lie beside’ and not necessarily ‘against’ 
(Hutcheon 1985: 32). However, the power to appropriate and restage elements is a 
significant one for the artist, as it is for the impostor or pathological creature, and it is 
often in Sherman’s subtlest parodic images that the reiterations are most effective. 
 
By using a postmodern approach to the impersonal performer, Sherman questions 
other performativities by appearing to stage, but always incompletely, the personal 
psychology and trauma of an apprehended subject. This may be an unsatisfying 
reading for those who choose to read the signs in her work as new ways of signifying 
abreaction and trauma. Her works are theoretically challenging because they present 
the impersonal surface of an anonymous form, counter to the equally impersonal 
dominant cultural practices of woman-as-image (Krauss: 1993: 41). She replays to the 
  
spectator, the cumulative effect of hysterical memory recall, building but not narrating 
a malady of representation. Laurence Senelick on the topic of drag, provokes us with 
the statement: ‘women are undoubtedly people but female impersonators seldom are’, 
(Senelick 2000: 312) so the impersonator as an impersonal form challenges the 
spectator with the question: ‘do I exist or am I the prosthesis of representation?’ 
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1
 The italicising of both the History Portraits and Film Stills in this article reflects 
the fact that they are recognised in critical discourses as collective bodies of 
work. Sherman left these works ‘untitled’ and only differentiated them by 
number with the typography ‘#’. This article repeats Sherman’s numbering 
system, without the word ‘untitled’ describing each piece, but notes here that all 
the works are usually referred to as ‘untitled’ in their publication and critical 
readings.  
2
 “There is” from The Phenomenological Theory of Being (Levinas: 1989). This  
short essay is unique within the Levinasian project, which is concerned with ethical  
relationships and alterity. In his nocturnal space identities are also interchangeable  
and “anything can count for anything else” suggesting an interchangeability which  
is depersonalised. 
3
 The use of ‘interpolate’ here is done so with the slippage intended in its 
closeness to interpellate (which means ‘to question’), with the difference being 
that interpolation has the function of ‘adding to an edition, especially with the 
intention of misleading’ according to the OED. 
4
 Michael Taussig in Mimesis and Alterity observes the function of the 
photograph: ‘Indeed photography concentrates to an exquisite degree the very 
act of colonial mirroring, the lens co-ordinating the mimetic impulses radiating 
from each side of the colonial divide’ (Taussig 1993:185-186). 
5
 Jean Baudrillard in a lecture ‘Integral Reality and Poetic Transfer’ (Sydney 
2001) makes a stronger connection between the performance of the 
photograph and the vanquishing powers of the copyist.  ‘The image is 
predicated on the original murder of reality. The disappearance of reality is 
spoken of by the impostor – it is still taboo in society’.  
6
 A historical example is the case of Madame M, who symptomatised World War 
One, by suffering repeated, hysterical misrecognitions of her murdered 
husband. Her fear of the eighty ‘sosies’ or impersonations of her husband, 
hidden in the cellars of Paris, was because she feared that he would be 
unrecognisable to her. (Schwartz 1996: 73). 
